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A &M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC.: COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT ON THE INTERNET
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution vests in Congress the power to pro-
tect the creative works of authors and inventors.' In order to facilitate
technological advancement, Congress has utilized its express constitu-
tional authority by making necessary changes to federal copyright law.2
The Federal Copyright Act is an example of modernization of Congres-
sional copyright law.3 At present, United States copyright law protects an
artist's work from the moment the work is completed, regardless of
whether the artist has notified the public of the work's authorship.4
Alternatively, innovative technology has also demanded that Con-
gress provide the general public with exceptions and defenses to an al-
leged violation of copyright law.' Consumers have the ability to repro-
duce copyrighted works with the aid of advanced technologies through
the use of photographic cameras, video recorders, and dual cassette
decks. The Audio Home Recording Act is one example of Congressional
efforts to minimize consumer liability when using these products.6 The
Act insulates individuals from liability for the manufacture or distribu-
tion of devices that digitally record audio mediums, or for employing
these mechanisms in a noncommercial fashion.7 Another example is the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which shields Internet service pro-
viders from liability based on use of the network by subscribers.8
Despite Congressional efforts, legislative responses to ever-
changing computer technology are often outdated upon introduction.9
The courts' propensity to defer to Congress regarding copyright law
compounds this problem.'0 Traditionally, courts have "refused to unilat-
erally broaden protections in response to technological change."" In re-
sponse to technological advancement, however, courts are being called
I. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See April M. Major, Copyright Law Tackles Yet Another Challenge: The Electronic
Frontier of the Worldwide Web, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 75, 76 (1998).
3. Id. at 86.
4. Id.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2001).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
7. Id.
8. See idL at. § 512.
9. Kevin Davis, Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul, 34 U.S.F.
L.REV. 129, 162 (1999).
10. Id. at 132.
11. Id.
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upon to move away from their deferential stance and enjoin the harmful
treatment of copyrighted works.'2
II. FACTS
A California student created Napster, Inc. to assist his college
roommate's efforts to exchange music with others. 3 Napster software
provides a forum in which users may distribute, trade, or download mu-
sic files free over the Internet. 4 A subscriber can use Napster to share a
collection of music with others by first copying compact discs to a com-
puter hard drive and then uploading those files onto the Napster
network." While the contents of those files remain on the uploading
user's hard drive, Napster lists the files in an on-line "collective direc-
tory."' 6 All Napster subscribers may then access this library via the Inter-
net.'"
Napster's system grew out of recent technology that uncovered a
new digital file format which can be used to store audio recordings,
commonly referred to as MP3 files.'" By compressing audio recordings
onto a computer's hard drive from a compact disc, this digital format
allows a person to transmit these files to another computer very quickly
by the use of an electronic mail account.' 9 Napster, through a process
referred to as 'peer-to-peer file sharing,' essentially "facilitates the
transmission of MP3 files between and among users."20
While Napster is currently a free service, the company was not de-
signed to be a non-profit organization.2' With an estimated 75 million
current users, over 100 people try to gain access to Napster every
second . Napster "plans to delay the maximization of revenues while it
attracts a large user base," and the "value of the system grows as the
quantity and quality of available music increases., 23 The company
planned to eventually 'monetize' its system through the use of advertis-
ing, marketing products and paybacks for providing links to other related
sites.2
12. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 64 U.S. 417, 457 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
13. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 902 (N.D.Cal. 2000).
14. Id. at 901.
15. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).





21. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 902 (N.D.Cal. 2000).
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Nearly all of the files that are uploaded or downloaded through
Napster's system are copyrighted.2 "Napster, Inc. has never obtained
licenses to distribute or download, or to facilitate others in distributing or
downloading, the music" copyrighted to others.26 Nevertheless, Napster
has continued to grow in size and popularity as a source for people to
increase their musical collections without having to pay what they would
ordinarily be required to pay by the copyright holder. 7
III. BACKGROUND
In 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the issue
of time-shifting, which involves the copying of a copyrighted work for
the convenience of watching or listening to it at a different time.: Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. brought an action alleging that the consumers of
video tape recorders (VTRs), manufactured by Sony Corporation of
America, were infringing on Universal's copyrights by recording copy-
righted works broadcast on television for later viewing. Universal
sought an injunction against the manufacture of the video tape recorders,
in addition to monetary damages. ° In denying relief to Universal, the
district court applied 'fair use' case law to determine whether the use of
VTRs was infringing, instrumentally affecting modem copyright law.3 '
As codified in Title 17 of the United States Code, a court may iden-
tify and weigh several factors in deciding whether the use of copyrighted
material constitutes fair use.32 Those factors include the character and
purpose of the material, the nature of the work, the amount copied, and
the market effects caused by the alleged infringement. 33 After considering
the facts in light of these factors, the district court concluded that "non-
commercial home-use" of VTRs was a fair use and ruled for Sony on all
claims.'
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, finding Sony liable for
contributory infringement.35 On review, the Supreme Court overturned
the Ninth Circuit's decision, ruling that Sony had prevailed in regard to
contributory infringement because the company had shown that most of
the copyright holders, particularly those involved with "sports, religious,
educational and other programming," approved of time-shifting. 6 The
25, Id. at 902-03.
26. Id. at 903.
27. Id. at 914.
28. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,421 (1984).
29. Id. at 420.
30. Id.
31. See Davis, supra note 9, at 136.
32. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-48.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
34. See Davis, supra note 9, at 136.
35. Id.
36. Sonyv, 464 U.S. at 443-44.
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Supreme Court stated that "a finding of contributory infringement would
inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of
their audience that is available only through time-shifting."3 Further-
more, the Court reasoned, Universal had failed to identify any possible
significant harm to potential markets for the copyrighted work." The
Court relied heavily on the fact that once a program had been recorded
onto a hard copy, that tape was not normally used in any illegal or pro-
hibited way.39
In 1994, the Court again used the fair use doctrine to rule in favor of
an alleged infringer of copyrighted works in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music.4° The case involved the leader of the musical group 2 Live Crew,
Luther Campbell, who was sued for infringing upon the copyrights of
Acuff-Rose Music. 4' The alleged infringement occurred when 2 Live
Crew recorded and distributed a commercial parody of Roy Orbison's
"Pretty Woman."42 Significantly, the Court protected Campbell under the
doctrine of fair use even though the reproduced work was commercial in
nature as opposed to the private use of recorded television programs in
Sony.43 The Court applied the factors of fair use listed in 17 U.S.C. §107,
and found that the original work had been transformed into a new work,
in this case a parody, and neither the commercial nature nor the fact that
the work had been copied in its entirety undercut Campbell's fair use of
the song."4
In 1995 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California heard a landmark case involving an allegation of copyright
infringement.4 5 Religious Technology Center sued Netcom, an on-line
system operator, for contributory copyright infringement. 46 Netcom had
been maintaining a 'computer bulletin board' on which both infringing
and non-infringing material was found posted.47 The significance of this
case rests with the court's insistence that the operator of a computer sys-
tem must have actual knowledge of infringing acts to be liable for con-
tributory copyright infringement.48 The Religious Technology court de-
termined that a service provider such as Netcom can be found liable for
contributory copyright infringement when it fails to remove material
37. Id. at 446.
38. Id.
39. Davis, supra note 9, at 137.
40. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
41. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
42. Davis, supra note 9, at 141.
43. Id. at 143.
44. Id. at 142.
45. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
46. See Religious Tech, 907 F.Supp. at 1361.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 1374.
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subsequent to being notified by the copyright holder of the material's
infringing nature.4 9 The Court further confirmed that secondary liability
in regard to copyright infringement relies on a finding of direct infringe-
ment by a third party. 50
Two recent decisions, Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia
Church of God"' and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.,5 have
both given today's courts added guidance when confronted with copy-
right infringement claims. The Worldwide court noted that commercial
use does not depend on the sale of the reproduced material. 53 Rather, the
proper inquiry of whether a reproduced copyrighted work is used for
profit is "whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the customary price. '" The UMG court
determined that the compression of an audio compact disk onto an MP-3
does not transform the work. ' Unlike Luther Campbell's transformation
of "Pretty Woman" into a parody, the use of MP3s does not make the
necessary transformation to be determined a fair use in light of the fac-
tors listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107.56
IV. A&M RECORDS, INC. V. NAPSTER, INC.
In August of 2000, plaintiffs A&M Records, et. al., sought and re-
ceived a preliminary injunction from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California.57 That injunction enjoined Napster
from "engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, up-
loading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or state
law, without express permission of the rights owner." 8 The district court
based the injunction on its finding that the plaintiffs own the copyrights
for around seventy percent of the files downloaded from the Napster site
and that Napster materially contributes to the downloading of those
works.59
On review in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Beezer addressed the issues
of whether the district court had employed appropriate legal standards
governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction and also whether the
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1371.
51. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1486 (2001).
52. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
53. Worldwide, 227 F.3d at 1117.
54. Id. (citing Harper & Rowe, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
55. UMG, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
56. Id.
57. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affid, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
58. Napster, 114 F. Supp 2d at 927.
59. See id.
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district court correctly apprehended the law with respect to the underly-
ing issues of the case.60 Holding preliminary injunctive relief available
only when a party "demonstrates either: (1) a combination of probable
success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that
serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips in its fa-
vor, '' 1 the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
62manded the case for decision in compliance with its ruling.
The appellate court first affirmed the district court's findings that
the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of direct infringement by
Napster users.63 Such a showing requires that a plaintiff demonstrate (1)
ownership of material allegedly infringed, and (2) that at least one right
given copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. §106 has been violated.64 Find-
ing that the record supported a conclusion of copyright ownership over
the material allegedly infringed, the Ninth Circuit noted that two exclu-
sive rights under 17 U.S.C. §106 had been violated: the right of repro-
duction,65 evidenced by the downloading of files from Napster's site, and
the right of distribution,' as evidenced by the uploading of files onto
67Napster's site.
The appellate court went on to affirm that Napster's users are not
fair users under the factors of 17 U.S.C. §107.6 Napster had unsuccess-
fully argued that people who use Napster's site are merely involved in
sampling, space-shifting, and permissive distribution.69 The Ninth Circuit
generally affirmed the district court's findings, relying on the holding in
UMG Recordings that no transformation occurs when music is com-
pressed to compact disc, which means that the purpose and character of
the work remains unchanged. 70 Also relevant to the first factor under
§ 107 is whether the reproduction is commercial rather than personal. The
court deferred to the precedent of Worldwide Church of God that
"[d]irect economic benefit is not required to demonstrate commercial
use. Rather, repeated and exploitive copying of copyrighted works, even
if copies are not offered for sale, may constitute commercial use.",7' Here,
60. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 1029.
63. See id. at 1013.
64. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2001) (explaining that infringement equals the
violation of rights listed in § 106).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
66. id. at § 106(3).
67. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
68. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
69. See id.
70. See id at 1015 (citing UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
71. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015 (citing Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of
God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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the court focused on the fact that uploading music to share and trade with
others does not evidence personal use.72
After agreeing with the district court that under the second factor the
original work is creative in nature, the court then focused on the third
factor, specifically the portion of the original used. 3 While finding no
error in the district court's conclusion that the fact that Napster users
trade and download entire copyrighted works favors the plaintiffs, the
appellate court made clear that wholesale copying, by itself, is generally
fair use under the holding of Sony."
Finally, regarding the effect on the market, the appellate court re-
jected Napster's claim that permissive uses such as sampling invalidate
plaintiffs' claim of harm to a new, potential market." Specifically, the
appellate court noted that because the effect on the current market does
not mediate a claim that a potential market is harmed, and due to the
commercial nature, sampling here does not lend itself to the defendants.
7 6
Finding no error in the district court's decision that space-shifting is not
fair use in regard to Napster users, the court distinguished the present
facts from those of Sony. In Sony, the video recordings were viewed by
individuals in their home. Here, however, once a work is recorded it is
simultaneously distributed to the general public.77 The court found no
reason to address Napster's argument that other uses, such as permissive
use, are fair uses, since plaintiffs did not challenge that point on appeal].
The appellate court further affirmed the district court's ruling that
"plaintiffs in all likelihood would establish Napster's liability as a con-
tributory infringer," since Napster's very conduct is evidence that it
"knowingly encourages and assists the infringement of plaintiffs' copy-
rights." 79 The Ninth Circuit refused to allow Napster protection under
Sony, pointing out that Sony had constructive knowledge that users could
infringe, as compared to Napster's actual and constructive knowledge
that infringement was taking place.Y The Napster Court added that the
Son), Court found the use of Sony's products substantially non-
infringing, as compared to plaintiffs' present allegations.8'
Nevertheless, the appellate court then departed from the reasoning
of the district court, which "improperly confined the use analysis to cur-
72. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
73. See id. at 1016.
74. See id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
75. SeeNapster, 239F.3dat 1016, 1018.
76. See id at 1018.
77. See id. at 1019.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 1020.
80. See id. (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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rent uses, ignoring the system's capabilities.,1 2 While the court did not
hold the district court's ruling on this issue clearly erroneous regarding
plaintiffs' probable success, it stressed the holding of Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc.,s which determined that a
computer system operator is not liable for infringing uses of the service
by others absent sufficient knowledge, demonstrated by a copyright
holder providing documentation to the service provider informing it that
infringing activities are taking place on the service.'M By providing "the
site and facilities" by which its users can infringe upon plaintiffs' copy-
righted works, the court found that Napster materially contributes to
copyright infringement, adding to the probable success on the issue of
contributory liability.85
Regarding vicarious liability, the appellate court again affirmed.86
Agreeing that Napster receives a financial benefit, the Ninth Circuit re-
marked that "financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing
material 'acts as a 'draw' for customers.'- 7 Further, the court held that
Napster has failed to employ its policing power, instead turning its back
to allegations of infringement occurring on its site thereby violating the
ruling of Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. , that the ability to block
infringing activity evidences supervision as required for vicarious liabil-
ity.
89
Napster argued that, in any event, a preliminary injunction should
have been denied due to two statutes: 90 the Audio Home Recording Act
(AHRA) of 19929' and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)9
Napster argued specifically that its users are protected by the AHRA
from claims of copyright infringement, and that Napster is alternatively
protected from contributory and vicarious liability under the DMCA.9
The appellate court responded first by interpreting the AHRA as not cov-
ering the "downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives," since the
"primary purpose" of computers is not to record, and computers record in
a different manner than that outlined in the Act.9" However, regarding the
applicability of the DMCA, the appellate court disagreed with the district
82. Id. at 1021.
83. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
84. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
85. Id. at 1022.
86. See id. at 1024.
87. Id. at 1023 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir.
1996)).
88. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262-64.
89. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
90. See id. at 1024.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
92. Id. at § 512(a)-(d).
93. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
94. Id.
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court's finding that § 512 of the DMCA is always inapplicable to secon-
dary infringers.95 Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the district
court's ruling that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because
"plaintiffs raise[d] serious questions regarding Napster's ability to obtain
shelter under § 512, and plaintiffs also demonstrate that the balance of
hardships tips in their favor."9
Particularly concerned with the district court's over-sweeping view
of contributory liability, the appellate court ultimately decided that the
preliminary injunction, while warranted, needed modification. 97 "Specifi-
cally, [the appellate court] reiterate[d] that contributory liability may
potentially be imposed only to the extent that Napster: (1) receives rea-
sonable knowledge of specific infringing files with copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings; (2) knows or should know that such
files are available on the Napster system; and (3) fails to act to prevent
viral distribution of the works."'98 The court held that Napster could still
be vicariously liable, "when it fails . . . to patrol its system and preclude
access to potentially infringing files listed in its search index."99 The
court held, however, that the injunction was overbroad in that it relied
only on Napster to protect plaintiffs works, above and beyond the re-
quirement that Napster "police the system within the limits of the sys-
tem. ' "'o° The appellate court placed the burden on the plaintiffs to provide
notice to Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works
available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to disable
access to the offending content.'0 ' The Ninth Circuit having stayed the
preliminary injunction pending appeal ruled that the injunction was to
remain stayed until modified in accordance with its decision.'0 2
The District Court for the Northern District of California reissued its
preliminary injunction against Napster in accordance with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's findings on March 5, 2001.103 The district court again enjoined
Napster from "engaging in, or facilitating others in, copying, download-
ing, uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted sound recordings
... ,,104 However this injunction required plaintiffs to provide Napster
with notice of copyrighted material, and specifically stated that both
"parties shall use reasonable measures in identifying variations of the
95. See id. at 1025 (construing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d)).
96. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
97. Id. at 1027
98. Id. (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
99. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1029.
103. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05183 MHP, 2001 WL 227083, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
104. A&M. Records, Inc., 2001 WL 227083 at *1.
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filename(s), or of the spelling of the titles or artists' names, of the works
identified by plaintiffs."' ' The district court further reiterated the Ninth
Circuit's ruling that the burden of keeping plaintiff's copyrighted mate-
rial is on both parties.' 6
V. ANALYSIS
A. Congress v. The Courts
These cases illustrate a shift of opinion regarding the role of the judi-
ciary when confronted with copyright issues. Courts, including the ma-
jority in Sony, have long deferred to congressional decisions concerning
the fit of modem technologies with copyright law. 07 As the Sony Court
aptly stated, "[r]epeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this
country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that
new technology made necessary."'O' Overturning the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision that the taping of televised programs on equipment
manufactured by Sony was not fair use, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that "[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
market for copyrighted materials."'O'
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell and
Rehnquist, attacking the majority's deferential stance, calling their deci-
sion a way to "evade the hard issues when they arise in the area of copy-
right law." ° It is important to note that the same court that heard Nap-
ster's appeals found Sony secondarily liable for copyright infringement,
declaring that because most of the material recorded by Sony betamax
machines was copyrighted work, "[Sony's machines] (VTRs) were not
suitable for any substantial noninfringing use. . . ."' The Ninth Circuit
also declined to accept a fair use defense by Sony because the "cumula-
tive effect of mass production made possible by VTRs would tend to
diminish the potential market."" 2
The Ninth Circuit's line of reasoning in the present case is strikingly
similar. Much debate exists as to whether the use of Napster currently
harms or supports plaintiff's business."3 However, when applying the fair
use doctrine factor that examines the effect of use on the market," 4 the
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
108. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31.
109. Id. at 431.
110. Id. at 457.
111. Id. at 428.
112. Id. at 427.
113. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2001).
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals again relied on the effect on plaintiffs'
potential market (distribution of copyrighted works on the Internet), even
if plaintiffs' current business is not harmed."5 This is a crucial finding, as
copyright holders do not have exclusive rights for those uses that are
determined fair under the factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107. " '
Technology will continue to present innovative businesses with
many new and untested markets. The Sony Court's majority opinion,
refusing to interfere with Congress's constitutional duty in regard to the
expansion or reduction of copyright holders' rights, seems overwhelm-
ingly sensible from this view. Through the use of special committees and
other resources, Congress likely has the means to make more informed
decisions than the judiciary, regardless of how long the decisional proc-
ess takes when compared to the speed of technological changes. This
case, on the other hand, is evidence of the fact that many courts will not
wait for Congress to act when confronted with copyright problems.
B. The Audio Home Recording Act and The Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act
Congress enacted the Audio Home Recording Act"7 in October of
1992, eight years after the Supreme Court decided in Sony to defer to
Congress the power to decide the issue of copyright infringement in re-
lation to the manufacture and use of home audio recording devices.
Therein, Congress exempted the production and implementation of these
devices for noncommercial uses."8 Again, just three years after the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California decided that a web site
host needs specific knowledge of infringing activities as well as time to
correct or somehow stop the infringing activity on its site before it will
be liable for copyright infringement, Congress responded to technologi-
cal advances by passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act." 9 This
legislation provides that a service provider of 'transitory digital network
communications' will not be held liable for copyright infringement based
on the infringing activities of its users, according to certain guidelines.'2°
It is possible that Congress will either amend these acts or draft some-
thing new in order to define when a provider of services similar to those
of Napster is responsible for copyright infringement.
The reasoning of both the district court and the appellate court in
denying Napster's users protection under the Audio Home Recording
Act relied primarily on the fact that "under the plain meaning of the
115. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1017.
116. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 433; 17 U.S.C. § 107.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
118. See id. at § 1008.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2001).
120. See id.
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Act's definition of digital audio recording devices, computers (and their
hard drives) are not digital audio recording devices because their 'pri-
mary purpose' is not to make digital audio copied recordings.' 2' A lay
reading of the statute's name, however, implies that uses of home re-
cording devices will not render a user liable of copyright infringement.
Napster's defense to contributory and vicarious liability is not as
clear. The district court insisted that a finding of potential contributory
and vicarious liability required that Napster be precluded from the insu-
lation afforded by §512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 22 The
appellate court refused to decide the issue, ruling that such potential li-
ability did not make the statute invalid per se, and left that question for
the district court on remand.' 23 Only because the plaintiffs "raised serious
questions regarding Napster's ability to obtain shelter under §512," com-
bined with plaintiffs' demonstration "that the balance of hardships tips in
their favor" did the Ninth Circuit affirm the district court's findings.'
Section 512 provides that a "service provider shall not be liable...
for injunctive or other relief' so long as the work is transmitted by some-
one other than the service provider. In other words, the material is trans-
mitted through a process that does not require the "selection of material
by the service provider," recipients of works are not selected by the
service provider, "no copy of the material made by the service provider
in the course of intennediate or transient storage" is accessible to per-
sons other than the intended recipients, and the material passes through
the service provider's site unchanged. 25 On remand, the district court
will be forced to interpret this statute. Of interest is the fact that the copy
of the MP3 file viewed by the other users who are logged on to Napster's
site is a copy that was made by the uploading user.126 Napster does not
copy the material listed on a user's computer, another user does. 27 Nap-
ster merely provides the forum for this to take place.'
28
In Sony, Universal unsuccessfully relied on the holding of Kalem
Co. v. Harper Brothers,'29 which found liable a producer who had made a
film dramatization of a copyrighted work.' 30 The Sony Court distin-
guished the facts of Kalem, in which a product displaying a recorded
performance was sold. 3' "The producer had personally appropriated the
121. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
122. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
126. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-12.
127. Id. at 1012.
128. Id.
129. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
130. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435-36 (1984).
131. Sony, 464 U.S. at 436.
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copyright owner's protected work and, as the owner of the tangible me-
dium of expression upon which the protected work was recorded,
authorized that use."'' The Kalem court disagreed that the producer had
any right to authorize this use of the film, adding that the producer had
also advertised the infringing product.'
3
The Sony court, in contrasting the film involved in Kalem with the
recording machine sold by Sony, stressed that the recorders are only a
means by which to reproduce, and Sony did not advertise infringing ac-
tivities.'T 4 "Sony supplies a piece of equipment that is generally capable
of copying the entire range of programs that may be televised: those that
are uncopyrighted, those that are copyrighted but may be copied without
objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright holder
would prefer not to have copied."'35 The Court certainly seemed to be
impressed by the range of uses by which the VTRs could be used.' 36
It is very possible that the district court will subsequently find Nap-
ster insulated by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The consequence
of that finding would be devastating to the plaintiffs' position. Since it is
Napster that the plaintiffs wish to enjoin, a finding that Napster's users
are liable for direct infringement while Napster is protected by statute
would frustrate the plaintiffs' hardship claims.
If Napster is alternatively found liable for secondary copyright in-
fringement, the line of liability may indeed become a slippery slope. That
finding could possibly mean that an Internet search engine, such as Ya-
hoo, that routes a web user to Napster's site is also vicariously liable. It is
obvious that search engines provide a service to obtain financial benefit,
and they also have the power to supervise what Internet sites are to be
found through the search function of such an engine. Would Yahoo be
forced to block or remove infringing material with notice by a copyright
holder? What about the manufacturer of the equipment that facilitates
these functions? Would Sony control? The answer likely lies with the
decision of Napster's liability by the district court on remand.
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright law in the United States continues to remain flexible,
though fundamentally lacking predictability. While traditionally relying
on the power of Congress to establish laws reflecting changed technol-
ogy, businesses such as Napster must now study judicial trends. As mod-
em technology affords the public faster and more efficient means by
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will likely be unable to keep up with technological advances in regard to
the infringement of copyrighted works.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. suggests that some courts are
willing to assist in the effort to provide public access to copyrighted
works while reserving the rights of the holder. There is no guarantee that
courts will be equipped to apply narrow technological statutes to specific
factual situations. When a statute does not seem to address an unexpected
factual situation made possible by modem technology, such as the use of
MP3s on computers, courts are required to substitute their judgment for
that of Congress. Technological advances will demand that courts apply
facts to ever-changing technological conditions, leaving case precedent
outdated almost immediately upon announcement. It seems, therefore,
that Congress will have the most success in guiding copyright law
through the twenty-first century. However it is anyone's guess as to
whether courts in the future will agree.
In the meantime, decisions such as Sony and the shelter of 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 should lead companies such as Napster to reconsider the structure
of their business. The Ninth Circuit's refusal to find Napster's users "fair
users" relied in part on the fact that the use of Napster was likely com-
mercial, due to the nature of uploading files containing music onto Nap-
ster's site, allowing all others also logged on at that time to view and
download these files. Napster or a competitor might be able to fashion a
similar service whereby it only provides the means by which to record,
similar to the machines used in Sony. The simple copying between users
who have found each other through their own endeavor certainly seems
less commercial than the uploading of files for the general public to
copy.
Not allowing the uploading of files would also serve to weaken the
argument regarding future markets. If record companies and performers
are concerned with not being able to sell their product over the Internet,
simple trading and copying between private individuals probably would
have little economic effect, as those people could record the same onto
tape or compact disk at home with no penalty.
The Ninth Circuit also distinguished the facts of Napster from Sony,
stating that Napster had more than the constructive knowledge found in
Sony. The elimination of the uploading feature might again strengthen
the position of Napster. In any case, a few changes in the functions of
Napster's web site could drastically change the legal situation, moving
the facts of Napster much closer to those of Sony.
A fundamental difference between Internet services like Napster and
other recording mediums, such as dual cassette decks and video record-
ers is the sheer number of people who use the service. Most recording
technology still requires people to find another who most likely bought
an official copy of the copyrighted work. These methods allow people to
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potentially engage in infringing activities, however, the actual method of
making copies assures that there is little effect on a copyright holder's
current and potential markets, as it is usually only the copyright holder
that has the means to mass-produce and mass-market a copyrighted
work. Napster's site, on the other hand, imposes on a copyright holder's
ability to outnumber possibly infringing uses by allowing millions of
people to access one person's uploaded music files. Viewed in this sense,
legal scholars will perhaps never be able to justify the co-existence of
decisions like Sony and Napster. If that is the case, Congress again ap-
pears the best equipped to make technological decisions regarding copy-
right law, since, unlike courts of law, legislation does not have to follow
a consistent, logical path of reasoning.
Jesse Wiens

